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Utilizando un panel de datos desbalanceado que cubre noventa y tres países durante el
periodo 1990-2002, este estudio analiza la relación empírica entre la concentración bancaria y
la volatilidad del crédito. El estudio encuentra una fuerte relación negativa entre la
concentración del crédito y su sensibilidad a choques externos. Asimismo,  muestra que estos
resultados son robustos a cambios en la muestra de países, a la definición de concentración y
a los modelos econométricos, y que esta relación negativa no se debe a periodos de crisis
bancarias. Los resultados están en línea con la hipótesis de que los bancos con poder de
mercado internalizan el efecto agregado de su contracción crediticia durante períodos
recesivos.
Abstract
This paper uses an unbalanced panel covering ninety-three countries over the 1990-2002
period to study the empirical relationship between bank concentration and credit volatility.
The paper finds that there is a strong negative relationship between loans concentration and
credit sensitivity to external shocks. It also shows that this result is robust to different
samples, measures of concentration and econometric techniques, and that this relationship is
not driven by crisis episodes. These results are in line with the hypothesis that banks with a
larger market share can internalize the countercyclical effects of expanding credit during
recessions.
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This paper studies the relationship between bank concentration and credit volatility. This topic is
closely linked to cross-border banking activity because there is a widespread concern that the
globalization of the banking industry may, by increasing concentration, reduce bank competition,
efficiency, and access to credit.
Although the paper is related to the literature on the relationship between bank
concentration and interest margins (see Berger and Hannan, 1998, Corvoiser and Gropp, 2001,
and Demirguç-Kunt et al., 2003, among others), the relationship between bank concentration and
growth (Cetorelli and Gambera, 2002), and the relationship between bank concentration and
financial fragility (see Allen and Gale, 2004, for a theoretical analysis and Beck et al., 2004, for
an empirical analysis), we focus on an additional possible effect of bank concentration and test
whether bank concentration is correlated with the way in which external shocks affect domestic
credit. This is important because it is well known that external factors are important determinants
of economic activity (this is especially the case in developing countries, see Calvo et al., 1993)
and that there is a causal relationship going from credit availability to GDP growth. Hence, any
mechanism that would amplify, through credit availability, the effect of an external shock would
also play a role in amplifying the high degree of macroeconomic volatility that characterizes the
majority of developing countries (Inter-American Development Bank, 1995).
 There are several channels through which concentration may affect how bank credit
reacts to external shocks and, interestingly, some of these channels predict opposite effects. On
the one hand, there are at least three reasons why higher concentration may play a role in
smoothing external shocks. First of all, a higher degree of concentration could be associated with
larger and more diversified banks. This higher degree of diversification would allow banks to
take more risk and, hence, continue lending during recessions. One caveat with this view is that
it is not clear that concentration is associated with more diversification (Boyd and Runkle, 1993).
Second, if a higher level of concentration is associated with higher profitability, banks with some
monopoly power could be able to build a buffer that would allow them to take more risk (Boot
and Greenbaum, 1993) and to reduce margins during economic downturns, especially if
increasing lending during bad times allows them to extract more rents during periods of
economic expansion (for a similar logic, see Petersen and Rajan, 1995). Finally, banks with a
lager market share could internalize the positive counter-cyclical effects of expanding credit2
during recessions or have incentives to reduce financial contagion (for a discussion on the latter
point see Allen and Gale, 2004).
On the other hand, it is possible that bank concentration may lead to higher
intermediation margins which, in turn, could increase macroeconomic instability. Smith (1998)
studies this channel by building a general equilibrium model in which banks with market power
can increase efficiency by improving the asset transformation mechanism but where market
powers is also associated with higher cost of funds for all classes of borrowers, independently
from their level of collateral. By calibrating his model, Smith (1998) shows that there is a wide
range of parameters that yield the conclusion that a less competitive banking system is associated
with lower economic activity and higher macroeconomic volatility.
Finally, while Boyd and de Nicolò (2005) find that bank concentration increases fragility,
Allen and Gale (2004) and Boyd et al. (2003) find that there is no clear theoretical relationship
between bank concentration and financial stability. In particular, Boyd et al. (2003) build a
general equilibrium model in which the relationship between the degree of bank competition and
the probability of a banking crisis depends on the level of inflation. According to their model,
monopolistic banking systems tend to be more crisis prone (with respect to a competitive
banking system) in low inflation environments but this result reverses when inflation is above a
certain threshold.  Beck et al. (2004) empirically test the relationship between concentration and
financial fragility and find that concentration is associated with a lower probability of observing
a systemic banking crisis.
It is important to note that several of the theoretical models discussed above assume a one
to one relationship between concentration and bank competition. Although this interpretation is
consistent with the traditional “structure conduct performance” approach in which the causality
goes from market structure to market performance (see Molyneux et al., 1994, for a survey
applied to the banking system), recent advances in industrial organization made it clear that this
direction of causality is not warranted and that it is perfectly possible for performance to affect
market structure. Claessens and Laeven (2003) recognize this possibility and test whether there is
a causal effect from concentration to (lower) competition and find no evidence for such a causal
effect. In fact, the theory of contestable markets (Baumol et al. 1982) suggests that a high level
of concentration is not inconsistent with the presence of a competitive market. According to this
view, some banks may have large market shares simply because they are more efficient than3
their competitors (Berger, 1995), and a situation where more efficient banks have a larger market
share is clearly a desirable outcome and not one that reduces social welfare.
As theory cannot help us in identifying a clear direction in the relationship between bank
concentration and macroeconomic volatility, in this paper we will take an agnostic stand and use
an empirical approach to evaluate whether such a relationship exists and in which direction the
relationship goes. Our main finding is that in countries with higher bank concentration domestic
credit reacts less to external shocks, suggesting that bank concentration is associated with lower
credit volatility. In our empirical analysis we also make an effort to separate the effect of
concentration from that of competition (as proxied by entry barriers) and find some evidence
indicating that it is concentration and not lack of competition that reduces volatility. In fact, our
results provide some evidence (albeit not very robust) suggesting that entry barriers increase
credit sensitivity to external shocks.
Data
Throughout the paper, we will study how concentration affects credit by focusing on real credit
growth (CRGR). We measure real credit growth using data from the International Financial
Statistics’ (2003) entry for “Credit to the Private Sector (lines 22d.f plus 22zw for Europe)
deflated by the CPI (line 64). Focusing on the 1990-2002 period, we were able to identify 54
countries with data on credit growth for the whole period (13 observations per country) and other
39 countries with at least 9 years of data, yielding a total of 93 countries and 1162 observations.
In order to avoid possible problems due to extreme values, we then dropped the country-years in
the top and bottom 2 percent of the distribution of our credit growth variable and obtained our
final sample consisting of 1116 observations.
The second key variable in the empirical analysis is our measure of real external shocks
(SHOCK). The real external shock is defined as the weighted average of GDP growth in country
i’s export partners.  Formally, we define the external shock as follows:
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where GDPGRj,t measures real GDP growth in country j in period t, φij,t is the fraction of export
from country i going to country j, and EXPi/GDPi measures country i average exports expressed
as a share of GDP. An advantage of our SHOCK measure is that it is highly correlated with GDP
and credit growth (if we regress GDP growth over our SHOCK variable and control for country
and year fixed effects, we find a coefficient of 1.5 and a t-statistics of 7.5) but it is exogenous
with respect to these variables.
Our third key variable is bank concentration (C3L).  Our main source of data is the
Bankscope (BSC) database that includes information on bank balance sheets in 179 countries. In
building an index of bank concentration, we faced three types of choices. The first had to do with
the type of index to be used. The second had to do with the variable that should be used to
measure concentration (assets or loans). The third had to do with the time dimension (purely
cross-sectional or panel).  With respect to the first choice, we decided to measure concentration
using the C3 index (share of the three largest banks over total banking system). This choice was
driven by the fact that C3 is the simplest measure of concentration and tends to work better in
small countries with few banks. With respect to the second choice, we decided to compute
concentration by using loans rather than assets (so, C3 is defined as share of loans of the three
largest banks over total loans). We chose loans instead of assets because loans are closer to the
concept of sales. It is worth nothing, however, that the two indexes of concentration yield
identical results.  With respect to the third choice, we followed Beck et al. (2004) and, rather
than computing indexes of concentration year by year, we computed average concentration for
the 1995-2002 period. One possible problem with this strategy is that our sample starts in 1990
and, as concentration is measured after some of the events we consider, this may lead to reverse
causality. We think that this is not a very important problem because our estimation strategy
focuses on the interaction between concentration and external shocks and it is hard to think that
credit growth could have a large effect on this interaction. In their study of the relationship
between bank concentration and fragility, Beck et al. (2004) investigate the possibility of reverse
causality going from fragility to concentration and find no evidence in support to this hypothesis.
Our fourth key variable is financial development (FINDEV). We measure financial
development by averaging the ratio between domestic credit and GDP (all data are from the
World Development Indicators).  In our sample, financial development averages 55 percent and
ranges from 3.5 percent (Sudan) to 195 percent (Japan).5
Empirical analysis
In this section, we run a set of fixed effects regressions aimed at estimating how concentration
affects the relationship between external shocks and credit growth.  Our basic specification takes
the following form:
() t i t i i i t i t i t i u CR FINDEV L C SHOCK CRGR , 1 , , , * 3 * + + + + + + = − λ δ γ β τ α
where  i α  is a country fixed effect and  i τ  is a time fixed effect. β  is a coefficient that captures
how credit growth reacts to external shocks. γ  is our parameter of interest and it measures how
bank concentration mitigates (if the coefficient is negative) or amplify (if the coefficient is
positive) the impact of external shocks on credit growth.  δ  measures how the size of the
financial system affects the impact of external shocks on credit growth. We expect δ  to be
negative because countries with a larger financial system should be able to cope with external
shocks better than countries with small financial systems. Finally, we control for mean reversion
by including the lagged log value of real credit.
Table 1 reports our basic results.  Column 1 shows that, as expected, real credit growth is
positively and significantly correlated with the external shock and that the data exhibit mean
reversion (λ=-0.12). We also find that the coefficient of the interaction between the external
shock and financial development is negative and statistically significant, indicating that in
countries with larger financial systems, credit growth tends to be less responsive to external
shocks.
<TABLE 1 HERE>
What is more interesting for our purposes is the negative, large, and statistically
significant coefficient of the interaction between the external shock and bank concentration.
This coefficient suggests that countries with more concentrated banking systems tend to respond
less to external shocks with respect to countries with less concentrated banking systems. This6
finding seems to support the theoretical models that associate higher concentration with higher
financial stability and is in line with the empirical findings of Beck et al. (2004) who suggest that
the frequency of banking crisis tends to be negatively correlated with bank concentration. The
coefficient also suggests that the impact of concentration is quantitatively important. Take for
instance a country with an average level of financial development (0.54) and the lowest level of
concentration (0.20). In this case, a one standard deviation change in the external shock (0.01)
would affect credit growth by approximately one standard deviation (0.11). If we consider,
instead, a country with the same level of financial development but the highest level of bank
concentration (0.96), we find that a one standard deviation change in the external shock (0.01)
has a minuscule effect (0.009, corresponding to less than one tenth of one standard deviation) on
credit growth.  If we repeat the same exercise but consider a change in the level of bank
concentration from the 25
th to the 75
th percentile of the cross-country distribution, we find that a
higher level of concentration reduces the effect of an external shock on credit growth by
approximately 50 percent (from 8 to 4.6 percent).
One possible problem with the estimation of column 1 is that we used OLS to estimate a
fixed effect model that includes a lagged dependent variable.  To address this issue in column 2,
we re-estimate the baseline model using the GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991).  We find that the model performs well in terms of the various specification tests (OIR
test and AR2 test) and that our results are basically unchanged.
In columns 3 and 4 we split the sample between industrial and developing countries.  We
find that the results are qualitatively similar to those of column 1, but we also find that the
mitigating effect of concentration is much stronger in developing countries.  The difference in
coefficients, however, is not statistically significant. In order to compare column 1 of Table 1
with columns 3 and 4, we simulated the effect of a one standard deviation change in the external
shock for the two groups of countries (industrial and developing) and for the whole sample under
different levels of bank concentration. In performing the simulation, we used group-specific
average values of financial development and measured the impact of the shock as share of the
group-specific standard deviation in credit growth. Our main finding is that, when we adjust for
the fact that in industrial countries credit is less volatile than in developing countries, the impact
of bank concentration in developing countries is similar to the impact of bank concentration in
industrial countries.7
In column 5 we check whether controlling for bank ownership affects our results. This
important because Levy Yeyati et al. (2003) argue that state owned banks may have the explicit
objective of stabilizing credit (in Micco and Panizza, 2004, we provide some evidence in this
direction).  If this were the case and if there were a correlation between state ownership of banks
and bank concentration, then our results could just proxy for the effect of ownership. Foreign
ownership may also be important. In particular, Caballero (2002) argues that foreign owned bank
may have played a destabilizing role during the negative shock that affected Chile in 1998 and
Galindo et al. (2004) discuss that, depending on the type of shock, foreign owned banks may
either stabilize or destabilize credit.  When we augment our baseline regression with the
interaction between the external shock and the share of total loans that are issued by state owned
banks and the interaction between the external shock and the share of total loans that are issued
by foreign owned banks we find that the ownership variables do not affect our basic result.
Column 5 shows that the coefficient on foreign participation is negative although not
statistically significant. Galindo et al. (2004) suggest that this should be the expected sign if
foreign banks have an advantage at canalizing foreign liquidity and our shock variable is a better
proxy of domestic liquidity than of domestic investment opportunities. The coefficient on public
ownership is positive and marginally significant (at the 10 percent confidence level) suggesting
that the presence of state owned banks is correlated with higher credit volatility. This result
seems at odds with our previous study (Micco and Panizza, 2004) where we showed that
individual public banks  tend to be less procyclical than their private counterparts. These
contrasting results have to do with the fact that the exercise of this paper focuses on cross-
country variation in public ownership and the exercise in Micco and Panizza (2004) focuses on
bank-level data. Taken together these results suggest that countries with more public banks are
more sensitive to external shocks (perhaps because public participation is associated with
country characteristics that may increase aggregate credit volatility e.g. lack of sound
institutions) but individual public banks react less to external shocks than their private
counterpart within each country.
Robustness Analysis8
One possible problem with the specifications of Table 1 is that financial development is likely be
endogenous with respect to credit volatility (countries with a more volatile credit market tend to
develop a smaller financial sector). To address this issue, we substitute FINDEV with a dummy
variable that takes value one for countries that have a common law legal system and zero
otherwise (common law is clearly exogenous and strongly correlated with financial development
La Porta et al., 1998). We find that substituting financial development does not affect our basic
results.
1 We also investigate whether using asset concentration makes a difference. We find that
when we repeat our baseline regression but replaces loan concentration with asset concentration
we find that the results are unchanged.
 To test whether our result is purely due to banking crises or whether concentration also
affects credit volatility in normal times, we augment our baseline specifications with a dummy
that takes value one during banking crises (we use data from Caprio and Klingebiel, 2003) and
with the interaction between this dummy and our measure of bank concentration. We find two
noteworthy results. As expected, the crisis dummy is negative and statistically significant;
indicating that credit growth tends to be low during episodes of systemic banking crises.
However, we also find that the interaction between the crisis dummy and bank concentration is
positive and statistically significant, indicating that credit contractions due to banking crises tend
to be smaller in countries with more concentrated banking systems. The effect is economically
important. The point estimates indicate that a one standard deviation increase in bank
concentration would reduce the negative impact of a banking crisis by approximately 25 percent.
This is another indication that bank concentration stabilizes credit. Furthermore, we still find that
the interaction between the external shock and bank concentration is negative, large, and
significant.
Can We Say Anything About the Channels?
After having shown that there is a robust negative correlation between concentration and
sensitivity to external shocks, we now explore some of the possible channels discussed in the
introduction. In particular, we check whether this relationship is due to the fact that higher
                                                     
1 In order to save space, we do not report the results of our robustness analysis. All the results are
available upon request.9
concentration is due to the presence of larger (and possibly more diversified) banks or whether
this relationship is due to regulations that restrict the competitiveness of the banking system and
generate monopoly rents.
To test the first hypothesis, we augment our baseline specification with the interaction
between the external shock and a variable measuring absolute bank size (SIZE is defined as the
time-invariant average of the log of the sum of loans issued by the 3 largest banks). If the
relationship between concentration and credit volatility were due to the fact that more
concentrated banking system tend to have larger (and possibly more diversified) banks, we
should find that SHOCK*SIZE has a negative coefficient and that controlling for this interaction
reduces the explanatory power of SHOCK*C3. Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show that
SHOCK*SIZE has the expected negative coefficient but that the coefficient is not statistically
significant. Moreover, the regression results show that controlling for SHOCK*SIZE has no
effect on the coefficient of SHOCK*C3. This seems to indicate that the smoothing effect of
concentration is not due to bank size. This result is consistent with the previous finding that large
banks do not seem to be more diversified than smaller banks (Boyd and Runkle, 1993).
2
<TABLE 2 HERE>
   The last four columns of Table 2 look at the effect of regulations that restrict
competition. Again, if the effect of concentration on credit growth were to go through lower
competition, we should expect that controlling for these factors should reduce the coefficients
and the explanatory power of SHOCK*C3.  We start by augmenting our baseline specification
with the interaction between the external shock and a variable that measures barrier to entry in
the banking system. In particular, we use a variable assembled by Barth et al. (2001) that
measures the number of denied entry application as a share of total entry application received
from both foreign and domestic institutions (DENY). While this variable is far from being
problem-free and its use greatly reduces the size of our sample, it can give us some idea on the
                                                     
2 In principle, economies of scale do not affect our Shock*C3 coefficient unless these are
increasing or decreasing. Increasing (decreasing) economies of scale would induce a positive
(negative) coefficient.10
mechanism that drives the relationship between concentration and credit growth.
3 If entry
restrictions have a positive impact on profit without greatly reducing efficiency, we should find a
negative coefficient for the SHOCK*DENY interaction and also find that controlling for this
variable reduces the explanatory power of SHOCK*C3.  If, instead, entry restrictions only
increase the inefficiency of the banking system, we should find that SHOCK*DENY increases
credit volatility and that including this variable in the regression does not affect the coefficient
and explanatory power of SHOCK*C3. Column 3 of Table 2 shows that this is the case. In
particular, we find that the coefficient of SHOCK*DENY is positive (although not statistically
significant) and that the coefficient of SHOCK*C3 remains negative and highly significant.
Column 4 shows that using Common Law instead of financial development does not affect the
results described above.
As a last experiment, we use Barth et al.’s (1999) index of regulatory restrictions on bank
activity (REST). The effects of these restrictions are ambiguous. On the one hand, they could
make banks safer and (by restricting competition) more profitable and hence more able to
perform countercyclical lending.  On the other hand, they could limit diversification, reduce
efficiency and explicitly limit lending activity (through margin requirements) during recessions.
Column 5 shows that SHOCK*REST has a positive (although not statistically significant)
coefficient and that including this variable in the regression does not affect our basic results.
Again, the results are unchanged if we substitute FINDEV with Common Law (column 6).
Conclusions
Economic theory yields ambiguous predictions on the relationship between bank concentration
and credit volatility. In this paper, we analyze the empirical relationship between bank
concentration and credit volatility using an unbalanced panel of 93 countries during the period
1990-2002. To identify this relationship, we study credit reaction to external shocks in countries
with different level of loan concentration. We find that there is a strong and negative relationship
                                                     
3 There are two types of problems with this variable. The first one has to do with the fact that the
variable is only available for the late 1990s. Barth et al (2005) show that this is not a very serious
problem because banking regulations tend to be stable over time. The second, and more serious
problem, has to do with the fact that a low number of denied application may not signal free11
between loans concentration and credit sensitivity to external shocks and that this result is robust
to different samples (industrial and developing countries), measures of concentration,
econometric techniques, and that it is not driven by crisis episodes. We also find that the result
does not vanish when we control for financial development, bank ownership, bank size and lack
of competition (measured by entry barriers).
It is worth noting that although our paper is purely positive, we did implicitly assign a
normative connotation to our findings and assumed that the shadow value of an extra dollar of
lending is higher during recessions than during economic expansions and, hence, credit
stabilization (or countercyclical lending) is socially optimal. This equivalent to believing that
over-lending during periods of economic expansion plants the seeds for the successive crisis and
that, during crises, there are valuable projects that are not executed or abandoned for lack of
financing. Alternatively, one may believe that technology plays a key role in determining the
business cycle and, as a consequence, investment projects will have low returns during economic
crises and high returns during economic expansion. In this set-up, procyclical lending would be
socially optimal and our finding that bank concentration reduces procyclicality should be seen as
evidence in favor of policies aimed at reducing bank concentration.
                                                                                                                                                                          
entry but could signal that nobody bothers to apply because but it could signal that nobody
bothers to apply because the probability of approval is extremely low.12
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Table 1: Concentration and Real Credit Growth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Log real credit t-1 -0.117 -0.199 -0.132 -0.021 -0.118
(0.013)*** (0.006)*** (0.016)*** (0.017) (0.013)***
Shock 16.551 15.184 16.712 16.254 13.301
(3.739)*** (1.733)*** (4.867)*** (4.765)*** (4.364)***
Shock*C3-Loan -13.713 -12.840 -14.451 -8.970 -12.121
(4.674)*** (2.403)*** (6.264)** (4.292)** (4.768)**
Shock*FINDEV -4.612 -5.367 -4.651 -7.629





Observations 1116 1002 830 286 1116
R-squared 0.2688 0.2671 0.4717 0.2709
Test OIR 0.152
Test AR 1 0.0005
Test AR 2 0.470
Period 1990s 1990s 1990s 1990s 1990s
Sample All All Developing Industrial All
Estimation Method OLS FE GMM AB OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE
Robust Standard errors in parentheses significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
OIR: Sargan test of overidentification restrictions.15
Table 2: Real Credit Growth and Regulation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log real cr. t-1 -0.118 -0.117 -0.135 -0.133 -0.147 -0.147
(0.013)*** (0.013)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)*** (0.016)***
Shock 20.993 21.532 14.605 15.015 12.087 8.312
(6.062)*** (5.601)*** (4.394)*** (4.202)*** (5.610)** (4.922)*
Shock*C3-Loan -14.236 -13.477 -17.504 -16.901 -12.153 -11.282
(4.708)*** (4.743)*** (5.559)*** (5.527)*** (4.445)*** (4.440)**










Observations 1116 1116 712 712 873 873
R-squared 0.2695 0.2705 0.3229 0.3274 0.2937 0.2921
Period 1990-2003
Sample All Countries
Robust Standard errors in parentheses * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%Documentos de Trabajo
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